For the allocation of heterogeneous items, it is known that the buyersare-substitutes condition is necessary and sufficient to ensure that a pricing equilibrium can yield the same allocation and payments as the VCG mechanism. Furthermore, concavity of the corresponding TU-game guarantees that this VCG outcome can also be achieved by an ascending price auction. We show that concavity, and hence the buyers-are-substitutes condition, holds for the TU-game of the assignment problem with general capacities. Therefore, the VCG mechanism is supported by a pricing equilibrium which can also be achieved by an ascending auction. We also show that the buyersare-substitutes condition, and hence concavity, does not hold anymore for very natural and straightforward extensions of this problem. This shows that the necessity of the substitutes property is a considerable restriction on the applicability of the VCG mechanism.
1 Introduction mechanism is limited. It has two main drawbacks. First, the final allocation does not necessarily correspond to a pricing equilibrium, which implies that the auction allocation is not the final allocation in the exchange economy. Second, the VCG mechanism might ask for a lot of computation and communication of confidential information. The central question we study in this paper, is for which exchange economies the VCG mechanism is applicable, i.e., the main drawbacks do not apply. We therefore consider both the relation between the VCG mechanism and pricing equilibria, and the relation between the VCG mechanism and a primal-dual auction that does not suffers from the second drawback. Leonard (1983) has shown for the classical assignment problem that the VCG mechanism is supported by any minimal price equilibrium with linear prices. In more general settings, the link between price equilibria and the VCG mechanism is missing and additional conditions are needed to recover it. Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) and Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) have studied the case where buyers bid for bundles of indivisible items. Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) first show that in the class of linear prices we may not find, in general, a price equilibrium. Therefore, they propose a richer class of prices, namely non-anonymous bundle prices. They show a result similar to Leonard (1983) if and only if the buyers are substitutes. Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) propose a combinatorial ascending price auction as the trading mechanism in the exchange economy. Under the stronger condition saying that the associated TU-game is concave, they show that the auction terminates in VCG payments. Apart from the argument that ascending auctions need less communication, there is also some empirical evidence that ascending auctions are more useful than the VCG mechanism itself. In experimental tests of Kagel and Levin (2001) it appears that in ascending auctions more players actually play the equilibrium strategy compared to the Vickrey auction. Players learn from the repetitive character of the auction and see less imaginary advantages from lying.
In this paper we first address the assignment problem with capacities, where buyers can bid for collections of items but the valuations are linear. We show that the corresponding TU-game is concave. Moreover, we show that this problem is a special case of the models discussed by Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) and Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) and therefore their results can be applied to this setting. Specifically, this means that the VCG mechanism corresponds to a pricing equilibrium, and the VCG mechanism can be replaced by the primal-dual auction. However, the concavity, and even the buyers-are-substitutes property, does not hold anymore when we include setup costs in the valuations of the buyers or when the items have different sizes, which we show by two counterexamples. We conclude that even for very straightforward extensions of the assignment problem we cannot ensure that the VCG mechanism is supported by price equilibria. Finally, we show that it may be necessary to have non-anonymous prices in the pricing equilibrium that corresponds to the VCG mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the basic definitions of mechanism design and TU-games. In section 3 we introduce the assignment problem with capacities and show that the corresponding TU-game is concave. In section 4 we present the results of Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) and Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) and show that they apply to the assignment problem with capacities. In section 5 we present two extensions of the assignment problem with capacities and show that the VCG mechanism is not supported, in general, by price equilibria. The paper ends with a summary of our results.
Preliminaries
First we will briefly review the notions borrowed from mechanism design that we need in this paper. Let A be a set of agents. Let T a denote the type space of agent a ∈ A. Agents' types are assumed to be private information. Write T := a∈A T a for the space of type profiles. Let O be the set of outcomes. By v a (t a , o) we denote the valuation that agent a assigns to outcome o when being of type t a . Agents are assumed to have quasi-linear utilities. Thus, the net valuation (or payoff) for outcome o and payment p of an agent a being of type t a is given by v a (t a , o) − p.
The aim of mechanism design is to implement a given social choice function ω : T → O that chooses the outcome ω(t) in O when t = (t a ) a∈A is the realization of types over agents. Write
for the maximal total valuation. An outcome o is called efficient if
A social choice function ω is said to be utilitarian if ω(t) is an efficient outcome for any profile t = (t a ) a∈A of types.
VCG MECHANISMS
Let ω be a utilitarian social choice function. The following VCG mechanism implements ω. Let r = (r a ) a∈A be the profile of types reported by the agents. The VCG mechanism chooses the outcome ω(r). Payments are defined as follows. Let r −a = (r b ) b∈A\{a} denote the profile of types reported by all agents except a. The payment for agent a is given by
the so-called Vickrey payment. The VCG mechanism has several nice properties, see Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995) . Most importantly, reporting truthfully is a weakly dominant strategy. Due to this property the mechanism does indeed choose the outcome ω(t) in equilibrium, and the resulting net utility (or payoff) of agent a is equal to his marginal contribution
TU-GAMES
We also briefly discuss the notions we need from cooperative game theory. A transferable utility game, or TU-game, is a pair (N, v) with set of players N and characteristic function v : 2
is a core element of the game (N, v) if i∈S u i ≥ v(S) for all coalitions S ⊂ N, and Following Shapley (1962) and Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) , we define the playersare-substitutes property as follows. A coalition B of players in N are substitutes in the game (N, v) if for all coalitions S ⊆ B it holds that
The game v is concave if for any two subsets S and T of N
An equivalent statement is that
holds for any coalition S ⊆ N and any a, b / ∈ S with a = b. In this paper we will use the following well-known proposition. 
The assignment problem with capacities is concave
In this section we analyze the assignment problem with capacities (APC) defined as follows. Let B be a set of buyers and I a set of items to be allocated to the buyers.
Each buyer b ∈ B has a valuation v bi ≥ 0 for item i ∈ I, and a capacity R b ≥ 0. All items are assumed to have size one, so the capacity R b of buyer b in fact indicates that buyer b wants at most R b items.
The goal of the assignment problem with capacities is to assign the items in such a way that no capacity restriction is violated and the total valuation is maximized.
Thus, the assignment problem AP C(B, I) with capacities (R b ) b∈B is to
where x bi is equal to 1 if item i is assigned to buyer b.
The optimal solution value of AP C(B, I) is denoted by V AP C (B, I). Now notice that, for a set of buyers A ⊆ B, the problem AP C(A, I) can be seen as a subproblem of AP C(B, I) by adding the constraints x bi = 0 for all i ∈ I and b / ∈ A to AP C(B, I).
Thus it makes sense to consider the TU-game (B,
The remainder of this section is used to prove concavity of this particular TU-game. The proof is in two parts. First we will prove concavity of this game in case all capacities R b are equal to one, the classical assignment problem. Then we will use this partial result to prove concavity of the TU-game for the general problem.
Proof. It suffices to prove that
holds for any subset A of B and any a, b / ∈ A with a = b. We show this by induction to the number of elements of A.
Suppose that A = φ. Obviously V AP C (φ, I) = 0. Thus, for any set I,
since V AP C ({a}, I) + V AP C ({b}, I) ≥ V AP C ({a, b}, I) easily follows from the optimality of the left hand side.
Suppose that the conditions are fulfilled for all coalitions A of B with |A| ≤ k. Take a set A with |A| = k + 1. Let a and b be two different buyers in B that are not in A. Take an item i ∈ I. First we show that
Consider the instance AP C(A, I) of the assignment problem. If item i is not assigned to any buyer in an optimal allocation, the inequality holds trivially as the left hand side will be equal to zero. So, suppose that in an optimal allocation item i is assigned to buyer c ∈ A. Then
where the first inequality is due to the induction hypothesis. Now consider the problem instance AP C(A ∪ {a, b}, I), and suppose that in an optimal assignment buyer a gets item j ∈ I. Then, using our previous observation to get the first inequality, we have
So in this case we found that
If in an optimal allocation no item is assigned to buyer a, this inequality still holds as the right hand side will be equal to zero. 2
The theorem above is an extension of the result of Shapley (1962) who proved that buyers are substitutes in the classical assignment problem, i.e., where
The result of Shapley follows from Theorem 1 and Proposition 1. We will now prove the concavity of the TU-game (B, v AP C ).
Theorem 2 The TU-game (B, v AP C ) is concave. 
since for any coalition A ⊂ B the assignment problem AP C(A • , I) with unit capacities we constructed has the same objective value as AP C(A, I). 2
Topkis (1998) proved that the optimal value of the objective function of the transportation problem is a submodular function of the agents' capacities. The transportation problem is an equivalent formulation to (APC) in terms of cost minimization. Our proof is easier and shorter though, and is also valid if total capacity is smaller than total demand.
Two applications
The main object of study in both Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) and Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) is an exchange economy with a set B of buyers and a set I of (indivisible) items to be sold by a single seller indicated by s. In fact this is a special case of the setting of Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) , since they initially also allowed multiple sellers. The valuation of buyer b for the set S ⊆ I of items is v bS ≥ 0. Valuations are assumed to be non-decreasing, i.e., v bS ≤ v bT for all buyers b ∈ B and all sets S, T ⊆ I with S ⊆ T , and v bφ = 0 for all buyers b ∈ B.
The result of Bikhchandani and Ostroy
The main result of Bickhchandani and Ostroy in this setting provides a link between minimal prices in a price equilibrium, the outcome of the VCG mechanism in this setting, and a TU-game that can be associated with this exchange economy. We will briefly discuss all relevant notions.
A price equilibrium in this setting is a price vector p = (p bS ) b∈B,S⊆I together with a
holds for all b ∈ B and S ⊆ I, and
holds for all partitions (S b ) b∈B of I. Such a price equilibrium corresponds to an economy where there are no resale possibilities. T b is interpreted as the set of items allocated to buyer b in B. This economy is called E 3 in Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) . A price equilibrium (p, T ) is said to be minimal if for any other price equilibrium (q, S) it holds that
A minimal equilibrium price vector is a price vector that is part of a minimal price equilibrium.
Alternatively the seller might decide to organize a combinatorial auction and use the VCG mechanism to sell the items in I. Given that the buyers report their valuations truthfully under this mechanism, the mechanism returns a partition (T b ) b∈B of I such Theorem 3 The following statements are equivalent.
(1) Buyers are substitutes in the TU-game (N, v B&O ).
(2) The vector (u(s), (u(b) b∈B ) of net utilities is a core allocation of the TU-game (N, v B&O ).
(3) Any minimal equilibrium price vector supports the VCG mechanism.
Application to the assignment problem with capacities
Consider the assignment problem with capacities with buyer set B, item set I, valuations v bi and capacities R b as it is defined in Section 3. This problem can also be seen as an exchange economy with valuations given by
for each buyer b ∈ B and each set of items S ⊆ I. Clearly, the valuations defined in this way are non-decreasing. Thus, in the light of Theorem 3 of Bikhchandani and Ostroy, the question arises whether buyers are substitutes in the game (N, v B&O ) associated with this exchange economy. Using our results from the previous section we will now show that this is indeed the case.
Theorem 4 Buyers are substitutes in the TU-game (N, v B&O ).
Proof. Notice that it suffices to prove that all players in B are substitutes in the TU-game (B, w) defined by
and (B, w) is concave by Theorem 2. Hence, by Proposition 1, the players in B are substitutes in the game (B, w). 2
The result of De Vries, Schummer and Vohra
Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) consider the same single seller exchange economy, defined in the beginning of this section, as Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) with the extra assumption that all v bS are integer.
They consider a combinatorial ascending price auction, called the Primal Dual auction or PD auction for short, as the trading mechanism in the exchange economy.
To define the PD auction we first need to introduce some notation.
Given a vector of prices p, the most preferred sets of items for buyer b are 
we say that F is undersupplied. We say that F is minimally undersupplied if F is undersupplied, and no proper subset of F is undersupplied.
Now let B * be the set of buyers b ∈ B for which there exists an S ∈ D b with v bS − p bS > 0. We say there is overdemand if B * is undersupplied.
The PD auction is an iterative procedure defined as follows.
PD auction
Step 0. Choose prices p bS = 0 for all b ∈ B and S ⊆ I.
Step 1. With respect to the current prices, ask each buyer b to report his most preferred sets of items, i.e., D b .
Step 2. If overdemand holds, choose a minimally undersupplied set A ⊆ B * and for each b ∈ A and each S ∈ D b increase the current price p bS by one unit and return to Step 1. All other prices stay the same for the moment. (This construction ensures in particular that p bφ = 0 throughout the auction.)
Step 3. If there is no overdemand, choose an element (T b ) b∈B in Z * , allocate the items in T b to buyer b ∈ B, and charge him current price p bT b .
Notice that we have some degree of freedom in the auction because of the freedom of choice of the minimally undersupplied sets and the final allocation in Z * . Any choice made here yields a version of the PD auction. Nevertheless, as Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) show, any PD auction constructed in this way features truthful reporting as an ex post Nash equilibrium, and in equilibrium it terminates in an efficient assignment.
For a coalition A ⊆ B of buyers, define
Theorem 4 of Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) states the following.
Theorem 5 Suppose that (B, v P D ) is concave. Then any PD auction terminates in VCG payments.
Application to the assignment problem with capacities
Again we can apply the result under consideration to the assignment problem with capacities. Using our result concerning the concavity of (B, v AP C ) we can show the following statement in the context of the assignment problem with capacities.
Theorem 6 A PD auction applied to the assignment problem with capacities generates a price vector p and an allocation T that constitute a price equilibrium (p, T ).
Moreover, p supports the VCG mechanism.
Proof. Let p = (p bS ) b∈B,S⊆I be the price vector generated by a certain PD auction, and let T = (T b ) b∈B be the corresponding final allocation. Since the PD auction terminates in an efficient allocation in equilibrium, we may assume that T together with the VCG payments (p(b)) b∈B is the outcome of the VCG mechanism.
It is clear that v AP C = v P D . Hence, by Theorem 2 and Theorem 5 we have that p(b) = p bT b holds for all buyers b ∈ B. Thus, it remains to show that (p, T ) is a price equilibrium.
Since T = (T b ) b∈B is an element of Z * , it is in particular feasible. Thus we know that T b ∈ D b for each buyer b ∈ B, and hence 
Impossibilities
In the previous section we proved that the TU-game associated with the assignment problem with capacities is concave. Therefore the buyers are substitutes in this TUgame, according to Proposition 1. Unfortunately concavity, and even the buyersare-substitutes property gets lost for other small and rather natural extensions of the assignment problem.
We also give a simple example of (APC) with a unique optimal assignment in which the VCG outcome is not supported by a price equilibrium where the prices are anonymous. Therefore, in general, the richer class of prices used by Bikhchandani and Ostroy, namely non-anonymous bundle prices, cannot be simplified for the assignment problem with capacities.
Generalized assignment problem
In this section we consider the case where each item i ∈ I consumes an amount rc i of the capacity of the buyers. This yields to the so-called Generalized Assignment Problem (GAP) with buyer independent resource consumption. The problem reads as follows
The value v GAP (A) for a coalition A of buyers is the optimal value of the objective function in the above (GAP) with the additional constraints that x bi = 0 whenever b / ∈ A.
In the resulting TU-game (B, v GAP ) the players will in general not be substitutes as the next example shows. Hence, also concavity will not hold in general.
Take buyer set B = {a, b, c} with capacities R a = 2, R b = 2 and R c = 1 respectively.
Take set of items I = {i, j, k} with resource consumption rc i = 2, rc j = 1 and rc k = 1 respectively. The buyers' valuations for the items are given in the table below.
i j k a 6 5 5 b 0 0 3 c 0 3 0 Table 1 : Valuations for GAP Given these valuations it is easy to see that v GAP (a, b, c) = 12, v GAP (a, c) = v GAP (a, b) = 10 and v GAP (a) = 10, which violates the substitutes condition
Since for this problem instance of (GAP) the buyers-are-substitutes property does not hold, we know that the VCG mechanism is not supported by a price equilibrium.
Let us illustrate this. We have that v GAP (b, c) = 6. Thus, the net utilities of buyers a, b and c are equal to 12 − 6 = 6, 12 − 10 = 2 and 12 − 10 = 2, respectively.
According to the optimal allocation, the buyers' payments are equal to 0, 1 and 1, respectively. This yields an auction revenue of 2. As the only optimal solution assigns item i to buyer a and items j and k to buyers c and b respectively, we have that in equilibrium 6 − p a{i} ≥ 10 − p a{j,k} . From the VCG payments we know that p a{i} = 0, so p a{j,k} ≥ 4, which gives the auctioneer a revenue of at least 4 > 2.
In a similar way, the vector of prices generated by the PD auction does not support the VCG mechanism. We will show that any PD auction will terminate with p a{j,k} = 4. Thus, as before, p cannot be a price equilibrium. Any PD auction starts with all prices equal to zero. This gives the following initial demand sets (assuming disposability):
Here B * = {a, b, c} is undersupplied as buyer a wants at least both j and k, buyer b wants at least item k and buyer c wants at least item j. The minimally undersupplied sets are {a, b} and {a, c}. Suppose that we choose {a, b}. The algorithm would then raise the price of all sets in D a and D b . After this first price-raise the demand sets remain the same, so we can do the same raise again, and even a third time. After the third iteration D a is still the same, but now D b = 2 I . Then the only minimally undersupplied set is {a, c}, so we raise the prices in D a a fourth time and also the prices in D c . After this, {i} ∈ D a . Because there is no overdemand anymore the algorithm will stop with p a{j,k} = 4. We arrive to the same conclusion if we choose {a, c} as the undersupplied set in the first iteration.
Setup costs
The planning problem assumes a linear valuation function for the buyers. In this section we include a setup cost f a in the valuation function. This results in the following linear program (APCS).
where x bi is defined as before and y b is equal to one if buyer b processes at least 
Similarly to previous section, we will show that the VCG mechanism is not supported by a price equilibrium and that the PD auction does not support the VCG mechanism. We have that v AP CS (b, c) = 12, so the net utilities of buyer a, b and c are 12 − 12 = 0, 12 − 10 = 2 and 12 − 3 = 9, respectively. According to the optimal allocation the buyers' payments are 0, 0 and 1 respectively, yielding an auction revenue of 1. Since in the only optimal solution buyer a gets no item, we have that p a{k,m} ≥ 2. Therefore, the auction revenue is at least 2 > 1.
In any PD auction we can also see that we will not terminate before p a{k,m} ≥ 2. The auction starts with all prices equal to zero. This gives the following initial demand sets (assuming disposability):
Here B * = {a, b, c} is undersupplied as buyer a wants at least items k and m, buyer b wants at least item k and buyer c wants at least item m. The minimally undersupplied sets are {a, b} and {a, c}. Suppose that we choose {a, b}. The algorithm would then raise the price of all sets in D a and D b . After this first price-raise D a remains the same, but D b becomes {S ⊆ B : |S| > 1}. Now {a, b} is not undersupplied anymore, but {a, c} is. Therefore, after raising the prices in D a and D c we have that p a{k,m} ≥ 2. The same conclusion can be derived if we choose {a, c} as the undersupplied set in the first iteration.
5.3 The VCG mechanism is not supported by anonymous prices Leonard (1983) showed for the classical assignment problem that the VCG mechanism is supported by any minimal price equilibrium vector with linear prices. Theorem 4 together with Theorem 3 shows that any minimal equilibrium price vector supports the VCG mechanism for the assignment problem with capacities (APC). But here the prices are not necessarily linear, and not even anonymous. We now show for (APC) that we really need non-anonymous prices to support the VCG mechanism.
Formally a price vector p = (p bS ) b∈B,S⊆I is called anonymous if p aS = p bS for all buyers a and b in B and sets S ⊆ I of items. It is called linear if for each i ∈ I there is a price φ i such that
for all b ∈ B and all S ⊆ I. Obviously a linear price vector is also anonymous.
Consider the instance of (APC) with B = {a, b}, I = {i, j, k}, R a = 1 and R b = 2.
The buyers' valuations are given by i j k a 5 4 2 b 5 4 1 The unique optimal solution for this problem is that buyer a gets item k, and buyer b gets items i and j. To calculate the VCG payments we also need the optimal solutions for the problems excluding one buyer at a time. Obviously, when on his own, a chooses item i, while b chooses items i and j when a is not present. The VCG payments are therefore p(a) = 9 − 9 = 0 and p(b) = 5 − 2 = 3.
With these VCG payments we get the following conflicting conditions for linear prices φ i , φ j and φ k that form a price equilibrium with the allocation that assigns k to a and i and j to b. From the coincidence of the equilibrium prices with the VCG payments we get that φ k = 0 and φ i + φ j = 3.
From the equilibrium conditions we get that 5 − φ i ≤ 2 − φ k and 4 − φ j ≤ 2 − φ k .
Using φ k = 0, we have that φ i ≥ 3 and φ j ≥ 2. These conditions are clearly conflicting with φ i + φ j = 3. From this we conclude that prices that support the VCG mechanism are necessarily non-linear. Now we also show that the prices cannot be anonymous. Let φ ij , φ ik and φ jk be the prices of the packages {i, j}, {i, k} and {j, k} respectively. By disposability player a has valuations 5, 5 and 4 for these packages. From the equilibrium conditions we therefore have that 5 − φ ij ≤ 2 − φ k and 5 − φ ik ≤ 2 − φ k and 4 − φ jk ≤ 2 − φ k .
So together with the conditions above we have that φ i ≥ 3, φ j ≥ 2, φ k = 0, φ ij ≥ 3, φ ik ≥ 3 and φ jk ≥ 2. From the perspective of the auctioneer these prices mean that the revenue from the auction is at least 5 by assigning for example i to buyer a and j and k to buyer b. This contradicts with the VCG outcome in which the auction has a revenue of 3.
Conclusions
We have studied the assignment problem with capacities. We have shown that the corresponding TU-game is concave. Therefore, the results of Bikhchandani and Ostroy (2002) and Vries, Schummer, and Vohra (2005) on the equivalence between the VCG mechanism and both price equilibria and ascending auctions hold. We have extended the assignment problem with capacities in two directions. First, we have studied the Generalized Assignment Problem with buyer independent consumptions. Second, we have added setup costs to the buyers valuations. For both extensions, the buyers-are-substitutes condition and therefore the concavity does not hold in general. This means that for those problem instances, the outcome of the VCG mechanism is not supported by a price equilibrium, and can not be achieved by an ascending auction. It would be interesting to know whether for other classes of problems this equivalence holds. Finally, we showed that the price equilibria that are equivalent to the VCG mechanism may need non-anonymous prices.
